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Abstract

ABSTRACT

Security attacks are becoming more prevalent as cyber attackers exploit system
vulnerabilities for financial gain. The resulting loss of revenue and reputation can have
deleterious effects on governments and businesses alike. Signature recognition and
anomaly detection are the most common security detection techniques in use today.
These techniques provide a strong defense. However, they fall short of detecting
complicated or sophisticated attacks. Recent literature suggests using security analytics to
differentiate between normal and malicious user activities.

The goal of this research is to develop a repeatable process to detect cyber attacks that is
fast, accurate, comprehensive, and scalable. A model was developed and evaluated using
several production log files provided by the University of North Florida Information
Technology Security department. This model uses security analytics to complement
existing security controls to detect suspicious user activity occurring in real time by
applying machine learning algorithms to multiple heterogeneous server-side log files.
The process is linearly scalable and comprehensive; as such it can be applied to any
enterprise environment. The process is composed of three steps. The first step is data
collection and transformation which involves identifying the source log files and
selecting a feature set from those files. The resulting feature set is then transformed into a
time series dataset using a sliding time window representation. Each instance of the
dataset is labeled as green, yellow, or red using three different unsupervised learning

xiii

methods, one of which is Partitioning around Medoids (PAM). The final step uses Deep
Learning to train and evaluate the model that will be used for detecting abnormal or
suspicious activities. Experiments using datasets of varying sizes of time granularity
resulted in a very high accuracy and performance. The time required to train and test the
model was surprisingly fast even for large datasets. This is the first research paper that
develops a model to detect cyber attacks using security analytics; hence this research
builds a foundation on which to expand upon for future research in this subject area.

xiv

Chapter 1

: Introd uction

INTRODUCTION

1.1

Overview

Security attacks are becoming more prevalent as cyber attackers exploit system
vulnerabilities for financial gain. Theft of Intellectual Property and destruction of
infrastructure are additional motives resulting from industrial espionage and Nation State
actors, respectively [Sood13]. Nation State actors employ the most skilled attackers with
the ability to launch targeted and coordinated attacks. Sony, Stuxnet, and Anthem are
recent examples of targeted attacks.

The time from a security breach to detection is measured in days [Muncaster15]. Cyber
attackers are aware of existing security controls and are continually improving their
attacks. To make matters worse, cyber attackers have a wide range of tools available
which allow them to bypass traditional security mechanisms. Zero day exploits, Malware
Infection Frameworks (MIF), Rootkits, and Browser Exploit Packs (BEP) can be readily
purchased on an underground market. Attackers can also purchase personal information
and compromised domains in order to launch additional attacks [Sood13]. A security
breach is inevitable. Early detection and mitigation are the best defense to surviving an
attack.
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Security professionals employ prevention and detection techniques to reduce the risk of a
security breach. In “Applying Data Mining Techniques to Intrusion Detection,” Ng. et al.
define a security breach as “any action the system owner deems unauthorized”
[Ng15]. Prevention techniques focus on making attacks more difficult. Some examples
of prevention techniques include: establishing a good security policy, applying recent
security updates, avoiding default configurations, and establishing an effective user
security education program [Garcia12]. All information security policies should adhere
to the three principles of the CIA triad which are Confidentiality, Integrity, and
Availability. Confidentiality is a set of rules that limits access to information. Integrity is
assurance that information is trustworthy and accurate. Availability refers to the ensuring
that all authorized users are able to access information systems.

Detection techniques fall into two categories, attack recognition or signature-based
detection, and anomaly-based detection. Traditional security solutions such as Firewalls,
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS), and virus scanners use a signature-based approach.
The signature-based approach compares a hash of the payload to a database of known
malicious signatures [Razzaq14]. Signature based detection techniques monitor network
traffic for ongoing attacks but fall short of detecting zero-day attacks or a variant of an
existing attack, also known as a mimicry attack [Garcia12]. These techniques provide a
strong defense against known attacks. However, they are by no means a sufficient guard
against skilled attackers who use the latest attack methods and exploits. Hence, they can
easily bypass any security controls in place [Ye05, Sood13].
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Anomaly detection detects abnormal events, including those that are not yet encountered.
In other words, anything abnormal is considered an attack [Ng15]. Anomaly detection
requires a model of normal system behavior. False positives can occur when normal
activities are detected to be irregular [Garcia12].

The Cyber Research Alliance (CRA) identified the application of Big Data Analytics to
cyber security as one of the top six priorities for future cyber security research and
development [Kott14]. Big Data Analytics (BDA) is the aggregating and correlating of a
broad range of heterogeneous data from multiple sources, and has the potential to detect
cyber threats within actionable time frames with minimal or no human intervention
[Kott14]. Security Analytics is the application of Big Data Analytics to cyber security.
Security Analytics is a new trend in the industry, and interest is expected to gain
momentum quickly. Finding appropriate algorithms required to locate hidden patterns in
huge amounts of data is just one of the several challenges that must be overcome.
Incomplete and noisy data are additional factors that must be considered. Finally, the
massive scale of enterprise security data available poses the greatest challenge to a
successful Security Analytics implementation [Kott14]. Security Analytics differs from
traditional approaches by separating what is normal from what is abnormal. In other
words, the focus is on the action or user activity instead of the payload content or
signature [Mahmood13].
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1.2

Problem Statement

The goal of this research is to develop a repeatable process to detect cyber attacks that is
fast, accurate, and scalable. The process should evaluate multiple data sources in order to
gain a comprehensive picture of user activity across multiple systems. User activity
patterns undergo normal fluctuations throughout the day, and often those patterns differ
from patterns that occur on weekends. The model is expected to differentiate between
normal fluctuations and abnormal user activities. A deep learning algorithm is used to
train a neural network to detect suspicious user activities.

This research is very closely related to one class of digital forensics which focuses on
discovering evidence of criminal activity inadvertently left in log files on computer
systems by hackers [Garfinkel16]. This research differs from digital forensics in that it
focuses on finding malicious activity patterns and identifying criminal activity while it is
occurring.
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Chapter 2

: Backgrou nd and Related Wor k

BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK

2.1

Background

Most computer systems record events in log files [Abad03]. The type and structure of log
files vary widely by system and platform. For example, weblogs are produced by web
servers running Apache or Internet Information Server (IIS) among others. Operating
systems, firewalls, and Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) record event information in log
files. Applications also record user activities in log files [Abad03]. Any activities
performed during a security breach will most likely result in log entries being recorded in
one or more log files. These attacks cannot be identified by a single log entry occurrence,
but instead, can be identified through a series of entries spanning several minutes
[Abad03]. The amount of data logged per system can be more than several thousand
events per minute. Additionally, these files are typically distributed across the network.
In order to process and analyze the log data, they must be integrated and stored in a
central location. Integrating highly heterogeneous data from multiple sources requires a
massive centralized data repository [Kott13]. Such a data repository should meet the
complexity requirements as defined by Big Data.
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2.1.1

Machine Learning

Big Data is defined by three characteristics: volume, velocity, and variety. Volume is the
size of the data stored and is measured in terabytes, petabytes, or Exabytes. Velocity is
the rate at which data is generated. Variety refers to the types of data, such as structured,
semi-structured, or non-structured [Mahmood13]. Structured data is data that typically
reside in a database or data warehouse. Examples of unstructured data are documents,
images, text messages, and tweets. Log data is considered semi-structured. In some cases,
log data contains key-value pairs or is stored in CSV format. Adam Jacobs, in “The
Pathologies of Big Data,” defines Big Data as “data whose size forces us to look beyond
the tried-and-true methods that are prevalent at that time” [Jacobs09]. Big Data presents
new challenges to searching and processing of data. These new challenges require new
techniques and methods, such as data mining or Big Data analytics.

Big data analytics employs data mining techniques for extracting actionable insights from
data to make intelligent business decisions [Apte03]. Commonly, the first step in Big
Data analytics is Extract Transform Load (ETL) [Mahmood13]. This is a pre-processing
step that transforms data into a format that is compatible with data mining algorithms
[Mahmood13]. The processing or analysis step applies an algorithm, such as clustering,
to the transformed data. Finally, the results are displayed on a dashboard or in a report
[Apte03]. Data mining is defined as the application of machine learning methods to large
datasets [Alpaydin14].
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Machine learning is a subfield of artificial intelligence that allows a computer to learn
using sample data without being programmed to anticipate every possible situation
[Alpaydin14]. The two most common types of machine learning are supervised and
unsupervised learning. Supervised learning is used when a dataset of labeled instances is
available. Supervised learning is used to solve classification problems. The goal of
supervised learning is to train the computer to learn to predict a value or classify an input
instance accurately. Unsupervised learning is used when a labeled dataset is not available.
Clustering is an unsupervised learning technique which results in grouping similar
instances in clusters. Clustering is used to discover patterns in data. In some cases,
clustering is performed to classify an unlabeled dataset and using the resulting classified
dataset for supervised learning [Alpaydin14].

Artificial Neural Network (ANN), proposed fifty years ago, is a collection of supervised
learning models inspired by the human brain. A simple neural network or multi-layer
perceptron is composed of three layers; an input layer, a hidden layer, and an output
layer. Each layer is composed of neurons, which are interconnected to all the neurons in
the next layer. The network is trained by adjusting the weights of the neurons to minimize
the error between the output neuron and the desired result [Edwards15]. A neural network
(Figure 1) using a large number of hidden layers is referred to as a deep neural network
and training is referred to as deep learning.
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Figure 1: Neural Network Diagram

In 2006, Geoffrey Hinton and Ruslan Salakhutdinov developed techniques using multiple
hidden layers. Pre-training was one such technique where the upper layers extract
features with a higher level of abstraction which is used by the lower layers for more
efficient classification. Unfortunately, since this technique requires billions of floating
point operations, it was not computationally feasible until recently. The recent advent of
technological advances in hardware caused a resurgence of interest due to the resulting
improvements to performance. For example, a researcher at the Switzerland-based Dalle
Molle Institute for Artificial Intelligence claims in one instance the training phase took
only three days using graphic processing units (GPUs) where using CPU’s would have
taken five months [Edwards15]. Deep learning works well with large datasets of labeled
data [Edwards15].
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2.1.2

Time Series

A time series dataset consists of continuous sequences of values or events which are
typically collected at fixed time intervals. Real-time surveillance systems, internet traffic,
network sensors, and on-line data collection tools generate time series data which can be
mined for valuable insights. Time series datasets have several applications, such as stock
market analysis, sales forecasting, process and quality control, budgetary analysis,
scientific experiments, and medical treatments [Han06].

Massive amounts of data can be generated in a constantly changing environment with a
large number of data sources. This presents an additional challenge when working with
time series data. In addition to a multitude of data formats, high change rate, and the large
volumes of data collected, time may be reported inconsistently, or data may contain noise
which obscures the “truth” within the data. Correlating events across multiple sources
provides a comprehensive picture of the chain of events. Synchronizing or correlating the
events from multiple sources introduces additional complexity [Han06].

There are three well-known window models: landmark windows, sliding windows, and
decaying windows [Zhu03]. A widow can be time-based or count based. The
exponentially decaying window (or damped window) is a variant of the sliding window
where older events have a lower weight than more recent events [Zhu02]. Landmark
windows contain aggregated values computed between a landmark point in time and the
present. An example would be the average stock price of a company since its last
acquisition [Zhu03].
-9-

Sliding windows are commonly used to facilitate effective event stream processing.
Instead of sampling or performing computations on all of the data, only recent data is
used for making decisions, thus reducing the memory required for processing.
Aggregates are computed on the last N values and stored in the window (Figure 2). As
time progresses, newer items are added, and older items are removed. The window is
usually of a fixed size. Limiting the processing to recent data also prevents less relevant
data from influencing statistical calculations [Zhu03].

Figure 2: Sliding Window Model

The objectives of time series analysis are to forecast future values, explain how past
events can impact future events, or how two time series can interact with each other.
Trend analysis, similarity search, clustering, and classification are typical processes used
to accomplish these objectives. Trend analysis involves identifying a trend, cyclic
movement, seasonal variations, or irregular movements. Trends are depicted using a trend
line over a long interval of time. Typical methods used for identifying long-term trends
include the weighted average and least squares methods. Cyclic movements refer to the
long term oscillations around a trend line. Seasonal variations are changes that are
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calendar based and typically recur, such as holidays. Irregular movements are random
chance events [Han06].

Similarity search finds sequences that differ slightly from a given sequence. Additionally,
similarity search can match partial sequences or the whole sequence. An example would
be to find a similar performing stock.

Clustering partitions time series data into groups based on similarity or a distance
measure. Classification builds a model based on the time series in order to predict the
label of an unlabeled time series.

2.2

Related Work

Many scholarly articles have been published on the topic of detecting intrusions using
data mining techniques or machine intelligence [Buczak16]. The following sections are
critical evaluations of recent research efforts on this topic.

2.2.1

Denial of Service and Brute force attacks

In “Applying Data Mining Techniques to Intrusion Detection,” Ng, et al. proposed an offline solution to detect Denial of Service (DoS) and brute force password attacks [Ng15].
Their solution implements both anomaly detection and signature recognition methods.
They maintain an attack signature database as well as a normal signature database. A
Clustering algorithm is used on pre-processed log data to identify multiple occurrences of
- 11 -

similar log messages. Their tool searches the signature databases using log patterns
detected while processing the log data. When the clustering algorithm detects an unusual
number of event occurrences, the signature is compared to the normal log database and is
ignored if found. If the signature is found in the existing attack signature database, then
an alert is generated. However, if the signature is not found in either signature database,
then it is presented to the user for manual classification. The initial log data was obtained
from one host running the Ubuntu operating system. Attack log data was obtained by
performing ICMP flood and brute force attacks against the host. A set of normal and
attack patterns obtained from the initial data collection were stored in the signature
database. They identified creating a real-time intrusion detection system as potential
future work.

The primary shortcoming of the solution developed by Ng, et al. is that it depends on a
single client log file source from one platform (Ubuntu). Additionally, it does not
differentiate between events that have occurred recently or far in the past. Since their
solution maintains a database of all normal activity patterns; it can only be implemented
as an off-line solution. As such, it is not linearly scalable, and cannot detect suspicious
user activity in real-time at an enterprise scale.

2.2.2

Web Application Attacks

Razzaq, et al. proposed a solution [Razzaq14] for detecting web application attacks by
analyzing HTTP requests. The proposed solution was deployed as a web proxy that
evaluates all network traffic before it is delivered to the web server. Even though the
- 12 -

solution only analyzes the HTTP protocol, they claim it could be expanded to other
protocols. Additionally, their solution only examines portions of the headers and payload
of user requests. They developed an ontology model (OWL) to build rules to analyze the
user request to detect web application attacks, such as SQL Injection, DNS Cache
poisoning attack, and HTTP response splitting attacks. These rules are applied to all user
requests by analyzing portions of the HTTP traffic before being processed by the web
server. Test attack vectors consisted of SQL Injection Cross Site Scripting (XSS) attacks
using an open source tool called Web Goat to simulate the attack vectors. The solution
detected web application attacks with an average detection rate of 86%. The detection
rate (Figure 3) is calculated using the total number of attack records (TA) and the number
of false negatives (FN). A false negative is an attack vector that is classified as normal.
The performance results of the proposed system were a maximum throughput of 1400
requests per second with a maximum response time of 374 ms.

Figure 3: Detection Rate Calculation

The most significant shortcoming with Razzaq’s proposed solution [Razzaq14] is that all
user traffic does not flow across a single web proxy. As a result, this solution is capable
of evaluating only a small portion of user activity which would inevitably result in a
security breach going unnoticed. Secondly, the solution only evaluates HTTP network
traffic and is not linearly scalable due to the delay in evaluating every single user request
before forwarding the request to its destination. Since most enterprise networks use
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Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) to encrypt the network traffic in motion, the network packets
will be unreadable unless the processing occurs at an SSL termination endpoint where the
traffic is decrypted. These types of issues can be easily overcome by evaluating log files
created by various computer systems.

2.2.3

Intrusion Detection Postmortem

Garcia, et al. proposed an off-line solution [Garcia12] to mine client log files to identify
the source of a security breach. Given a security incident has already been detected, and a
set of client log files, their system will attempt to locate the exploit in one of the log files.
Postmortem intrusion detection is primarily used to discover how an intruder gained
access to a system, what subsystems were accessed, and what information was
compromised. The solution assumes that a security breach has already occurred and
bypassed the Intrusion Detection System or any other security controls in place. This
solution uses a combination of anomaly detection and a classification technique called
KHMM which utilizes a Hidden Markov Model (HMM) and k-means clustering. The
main idea around their work is that an attack would result in a sequence of system calls
being logged that would not normally appear in normal activity. Normal log data is used
to create a normal behavior profile. First, the log files are shrunk by replacing repetitive
sequences with a meta-symbol. The log files are then pre-processed using a sliding
window containing one hundred elements, stepping through the log file one hundred
elements at a time. The last step builds the normal activity model from vector sequences
in each window. The resulting model is used for detection. The KHMM process is
composed of three steps. First, the preprocessed input is clustered using K-means. Then
- 14 -

the sliding window approach is used to create an HMM for each window. The last step
uses an anomaly detection to compare each window with the average HMM from the
previous step. If two or more consecutive abnormal windows are detected, they are
marked for verification by a security analyst. The training and validation sets were
composed of 32 log files from three Unix based systems (REL4, Fedora 8, and Ubuntu
9.04). The attack logs were synthetically generated using “buffer overflow” and “user to
root” attacks. Experiments resulted in an average detection rate of 81.99% and false
positive rate of 4.6%.

A major shortcoming of the solution proposed by Garcia et al. is that it does not detect
intrusions; instead, it attempts to locate abnormal activity in a collection of client log files
after a security breach has already been deemed to have occurred. Secondly, their
solution can be only implemented in an off-line manner because it is not linearly scalable.
This is primarily due to the fact that their solution evaluates every single user action.
Scalability can be achieved by using aggregates over time of all user activity. Their
solution implements a sliding window that is based on the number of events from an
individual user and slides over the user session in increments equal to the size of the
window. This method allows for a user sequence to cross window boundaries. Hence this
presents a likely possibility that an attack sequence will be overlooked. This issue can be
resolved by sliding the window using smaller increments.

Lastly, their solution is not effective because it only considers one log source type which
records individual user commands. This solution may lend itself to a low false positive
rate; however, if all user activity is not captured in the log, then it is highly probable that
- 15 -

a security breach will go unnoticed. In order to overcome this problem, multiple server
source log files must be evaluated to get a complete picture of overall user activity.

2.2.4

Training a Neural Network to Mimic a Firewall

Valentan and Maly, in “Network firewall using artificial neural networks,” train a multilayer perceptron (MLP) artificial neural network to learn the rules of a firewall from the
network traffic using the back propagation method [Valentan13]. The network consisted
of 3 output neurons (ALLOW, REJECT, DENY), 49 input neurons, and 13 hidden
neurons. The input neurons were mapped to the binary representation of IP (32 bit), port
(16 bit), and protocol (1 bit). If the activation function (sigmoid) did not fire any of the
output neurons, the network assumed the network packet was malicious and dropped it.
The accuracy of the neural network on the testing set was 99.79%. A training dataset was
generated before each epoch. The network used a cross-validation method for training.
The generated dataset was split into two distinct sets (80% for training, and 20% for
testing), the former for training, and the latter for testing. Network packets were created
by randomly selecting a rule from the firewall table, and then randomly generating a
network packet to match that rule. The training dataset consisted of a ratio of 4:1 DENY
to ALLOW network packets. For testing, the dataset consisted of an equal ratio of DENY
and ALLOW packets. The table of rules contains the associated action of ALLOW,
REJECT, or DENY. The neural network is given the correct action during the training
phase. The difference between the REJECT and DENY action is that DENY results in the
packet being dropped with no response being sent to the source resulting in a “connection
timed out” error. In the case of a REJECT action, the packet is prohibited from being sent
- 16 -

further. However, an ICMP destination unreachable response is communicated back to
the source. Evaluation of the performance of the neural network was performed by
comparing the total false positives and false negatives to the total number of packets
evaluated. False positives were defined as malicious packets that were allowed. False
negatives were normal packets that were blocked.

Training a neural network to learn the rules of a firewall is not an effective method of
detecting or deterring intruders. The success of their solution is dependent on how
effective the rules are at blocking malicious traffic. Commercial firewall and intrusion
detection software is a better alternative for hardening the network security posture. A
neural network can supplement a commercial intrusion detection system, but must be
non-intrusive, and cannot impede normal operations.

2.3

Shortcomings of existing solutions

The most prevalent shortcoming of all the solutions reviewed is that they only detect and
prevent individual attacks and not coordinated distributed attacks [Abad03]. Many
attacks are not identified by a single log source but instead discovered when correlating
information from multiple log files [Abad03]. If the attack does not result in an event
being logged in the log file that is being monitored, then the attack cannot be detected
using existing approaches.

Scalability is another major factor in evaluating the effectiveness of a solution. In the
world of Big Data, the amount of information being stored and searched can easily grow
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to several gigabytes very quickly [Garcia12]. Hence, a solution that does not scale
linearly can result in slow detection response times or total system failure.

Additionally, a solution that evaluates raw network traffic to detect intrusions will result
in overhead that will eventually inhibit the traffic being delivered to its destination
promptly. Intrusion Detection Systems and Firewalls serve as protection controls to
harden the security of the network. These systems should be complemented by
implementing detection systems that are less intrusive.
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Chapter 3

: Proposed Ap proach

PROPOSED APPROACH

3.1

Overview

This research introduces the concept of a time slot. A time slot represents a small window
in time which contains aggregate feature counts for that time interval. The time slot ts
slides over a fixed window of time tw.

The proposed approach consists of five major steps (Figure 4) with the output from each
step serving as the input to the subsequent step in the process. The first step in the
process, Data Collection, involves identifying and extracting log files from production
systems.

Figure 4: Process Flow Diagram
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Data pre-processing is required to transform the data into a format usable by machine
learning algorithms. Feature Selection is the process of identifying and selecting relevant
features from the pre-processed dataset. Unsupervised learning is used to identify and
learn patterns of user activity. This can be accomplished using clustering techniques.
Feature selection and unsupervised learning only need to occur for training purposes. In
the Supervised Learning step, the model is trained and evaluated using a classification
technique using the labeled dataset from the previous step. After the model produces
acceptable results, the model is trained and can be used in production phase to detect
abnormal user activity.

In this research, a log entry (or instance) is referred to as an event. The term “source” is
used to refer to an instance of a log file. The term “index” is used to refer to loading and
parsing a log file using a search tool. The term “source type” is used to refer to a
collection of log files of the same type. For example, the source type Neptune refers to
the collection of log files from the Microsoft Internet Information servers used to service
requests to the Microsoft Exchange servers. Microsoft Exchange is a Windows based
email system.

3.2

Data Extraction and Transformation

This step is composed of three sub-tasks that collectively produce the required datasets
for machine learning to occur. The data collection sub-task is the process of identifying,
extracting, and integrating log data from the source systems into a single repository. Preprocessing is required to reduce the size of the dataset and transform it into a sliding
- 20 -

window representation. Feature selection, the process of identifying a set of features from
the data to be used in machine learning, is only performed for initial training and
evaluation of the model.

3.2.1. Data Collection

A familiarity with all available log source types is necessary for the purposes of detecting
cyber attacks. Interviewing security professionals to identify a list of available source
types is the first step in data collection. The available sources typically differ among
organizations depending on their network architecture. However, possible source types
may include email usage activity, firewall data, wireless access point (WAP) data,
browser activity, physical facility access data, and Security Information and Event
Management (SIEM) data [Mahmood13]. Web application log files are also prime
candidates for consumption. Integrating these sources into a single repository allows us to
build a comprehensive picture of user activity across multiple systems. Such a repository
will allow us to gain insight into user activity that may be otherwise missed if examining
the sources individually.

Understanding how any form of an attack could manifest itself in each of the source types
is necessary for identifying potential attributes for feature extraction. The last step of data
collection is identifying candidate features for extraction. The results of this step are
needed in the pre-processing step where the feature extraction occurs.
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3.2.2. Pre-Processing

Data transformation operations are used to convert the dataset into an appropriate
structure to facilitate machine learning. Data aggregation and feature selection are
common data transformation techniques used to obtain a reduced representation of the
dataset without impacting its predictive accuracy [Han06].

The first step in pre-processing is to align the events in each of the source types by their
respective time stamp and compute aggregate feature counts per unit time. The next step
computes aggregate counts per time slot. A time slot has a fixed size and slides through
time incrementally by one unit. For example, a time slot starting at time index t and size
N will contain the count of feature occurrences starting at t and ending at t+N-1. Each
row of the pre-processed dataset represents a collection of feature counts Fi for a single
time slot tsj. A conceptual representation of the resulting pre-processed dataset with the
sliding time window is depicted in Figure 5.

Figure 5: Pre-processed dataset with sliding time window
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3.2.3. Feature Selection

A feature is an input variable or attribute that is binary, categorical or continuous in
nature. The primary focus of feature selection is concerned with selecting relevant and
informative features. However, other benefits exist, such as to limit storage requirements,
increase calculation speed, increase predictive accuracy, and to gain an understanding of
the process that generated the dataset [Guyon06].

Integrating data from multiple sources may result in a dataset containing hundreds of
features some of which may be irrelevant or redundant. Redundancy can be detected by
performing correlation analysis. Correlation analysis evaluates the correlation between
two features. Chi-square is a common statistical method used to detect redundancy. There
are other feature evaluation measures, such as Information Gain, Gain ratio, and the Gini
index [Han06].

Selecting the best feature set often requires human expertise to convert raw data into a
useful set of features. However, a variety of feature selection methods can be used in the
absence of a subject matter expert (SME). Such methods are classified as either filters,
wrappers, or embedded methods. Classical statistical methods which use correlation
coefficients, such as the T-test, F-test, and chi-square, are types of filter methods used to
assess variable independence. Filters calculate feature ranking based on classic statistical
methods, where wrappers use the performance of a machine learning algorithm trained
with the given feature subset. Embedded methods perform feature selection in the process
of training, and are specific to a machine learning algorithm [Guyon06]. The hidden
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layers generated during training in a neural network are an example of an embedded
method.

3.3

Unsupervised Learning

Unsupervised learning techniques are typically used when the class label of each data
element in a dataset is unknown. Clustering, a type of unsupervised learning is the
process of grouping similar data elements into classes or clusters. Euclidean, Manhattan,
and Minkowski are common similarity measures used by clustering algorithms. There are
a variety of different types of clustering techniques, including but not limited to
partitioning, hierarchical, density-based, and grid-based methods.

Outlier detection is a common application of clustering. Outliers are data elements that
are far from all other elements and fall outside of any cluster. In some cases, the outlier
may provide more insight into a problem than the normal items. Applications of outlier
detection include credit card fraud detection and monitoring of electronic commerce for
criminal activities. Clustering may be used in lieu of manual classification when working
with very large datasets which could be very time-consuming and prone to human error.

Clustering is highly adaptable to change and can identify distinguishing features in the
dataset. However, it also has some challenges. For example, clustering a large dataset
may lead to biased results. Additionally, the results can be affected by noise, outliers, or
missing elements. Mixed data types introduce additional complexity.
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K-means is a common partitioning algorithm which calculates the center of each cluster
using the mean value of all the objects in the cluster. K-medoids is similar, but instead of
using the mean for the center of the cluster, it uses objects located near the center of the
cluster. Partitioning based methods must be extended when working with very large
datasets.

3.4

Supervised Learning

Supervised learning is the process of training a machine to accurately classify an instance
or predict a value based on past examples. Data classification uses a labeled set of data
called a training set to train a model for prediction, and a test set for evaluation purposes.
There are several algorithms available used for classification. A renewed interest in
neural networks has peaked with recent technological advances in computing power.
Deep neural networks are especially known to perform well with large datasets
[Edwards15].

3.5

Measurements and Evaluation

The following performance measures were used to evaluate the effectiveness of the
proposed model. Accuracy is an overall measurement. However, Recall and f-score are
equally important. For example, if an alert is raised when there is no security incident in
progress, the cost is likely an inconvenience, however, if a security incident goes
unnoticed, the cost could be devastating depending on the nature of the incident
[Alpaydin14].
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Accuracy (Equation 1) is defined as the ratio of correctly classified time slots to the total
number of time slots [Alpaydin14].

Equation 1: Accuracy

Precision (Equation 2) is defined as the ratio of true positives to all time slots classified as
positive. For example, time slots correctly classified as normal to the total number of time
slots classified as normal [Alpaydin14].

Equation 2: Precision

Recall (Equation 3) is defined as the ratio of true positives to the total number of actual
positive time slots. In other words, the number of time slots classified correctly to the
total actual time slots [Alpaydin14].

Equation 3: Recall

F-score is defined as the harmonic mean between precision and recall. This measure
discourages models that sacrifice one measure over another [Han06].
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In addition to measuring the detection performance, the training and test time was also
evaluated. These measures were used to support the claim that this model is accurate,
fast, and scalable.

This approach was assessed through experimentation using datasets of differing time
granularity. An initial model and preliminary results using two distinct datasets are
presented in the next chapter. Chapter 5 introduces additional enhancements to the model,
a third dataset, and compares the results on each dataset.
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Chapter 4

: Initial M odel and Preliminary Results

INITIAL MODEL AND PRELIMINARY RESULTS

4.1

System Architecture

The proposed system architecture, depicted in Figure 6, was implemented using Splunk
Enterprise Edition 6.42 [Splunk17], R-Studio, and three sources which will be described
in more detail in the next section. The source log files were manually loaded into Splunk
using its web interface. However, a Splunk forwarder may be used to forward log files to
the Splunk indexer for parsing and storing in real-time. A Splunk forwarder is also
capable of receiving log data on a dedicated TCP port from high-speed appliances, such
as a firewall. The Splunk search head hosts the web-based user interface and executes
interactive searches and presents the results to the user.

Figure 6: Proposed Solution Architecture
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Splunk, a commercial log aggregation application, is used for indexing, searching, and
transformation of log data. Splunk was chosen for its ease of use, fast performance, and
advanced search language functionality. Loading a log file into Splunk can be initiated
via drag and drop operation, and completed with just a few mouse clicks. Additionally,
Splunk’s architecture makes it a primary candidate for use in an online implementation.
Since Splunk requires log files to be no larger than 500 MB in size, a log file splitter
utility was used to load and index the log file. Due to the massive size of the logs, the
import process spanned several days. The status of the import process can be determined
anytime during or after the log import process by executing the Splunk command
depicted in Figure 7. This command will display the source type, first event, last event,
and a total number of events logged for each source type.

| metadata type=sourcetypes | eval firstEvent = strftime(firstTime, "%m-%d-%Y %H:%M:%S") | eval
lastEvent=strftime(lastTime,"%m-%d-%Y %H:%M:%S") | table sourcetype, firstEvent, lastEvent,
totalCount | sort firstEvent

Figure 7: Verify Log File Import

A Splunk search command was executed to create a dataset of aggregate feature counts in
one-minute intervals. This aggregated data was then exported to a CSV file, and fed into
the Pre-Processing module. The Pre-Processing module converts the one-minute interval
total counts to into a five-minute sliding window representation. For initial training, the
data is fed into the Clustering Module where the dataset is classified and labeled. The
resulting classified dataset is used by the Deep Learning module for training and testing.
After the model is trained, Pre-Processed data is then fed directly into the Deep Learning
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module for incident detection. The system will generate in real-time alerts and updates to
dashboards when it detects abnormal activity.

4.2

Data Collection

The University of North Florida Information Technology Security Department provided a
“sanitized” set of log files used for this experiment. These files were extracted from real
production system logs and altered to obscure user information. The log files are listed in
Table 1.

Table 1: Source Log Files

Two datasets were extracted from the integrated log files in Table 1 for the purposes of
evaluating the model performance with varying parameters. These datasets are defined in
Table 2. The main difference between the two datasets is the size of the dataset and its
time window. Experimentation was performed using each dataset.
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Table 2: Dataset Definitions

The datasets depicted in Table 2 were created using the time slot concept to model the
data. The time slot size selected for both datasets was five minutes. Each row in the
dataset contains aggregate feature counts for five minutes. For example, in three hours of
log data examined, one time slot represented aggregate counts of 26,807 events. This has
the effect of reducing the number of resources needed to represent all the data for each
dataset drastically allowing the system to scale linearly as new log files are introduced.

The log files for this research were extracted from the source systems, compressed, and
transferred to DVD media. As a result, this research method is conducted in an off-line
manner. A production deployment is not in the scope of this research. However, this
research can be implemented in a near real-time manner. The training and test datasets
needed for this research are created using the log files and contain aggregate count values
in time series.
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4.3

Feature Selection

The features selected for machine learning are derived counts based on specific attributes
from one or more log files. Selecting the individual user names or IP values as features
would result in a sparse matrix which would exponentially increase the memory
requirement. By examining three hours of the data collected it becomes evident that such
a solution would not be linearly scalable. In one particular case, there were no more than
316 active users out of a total 2,436 possible users. Figure 8 depicts the distribution of
active users for this timeframe. Similarly, approximately 50% of the possible IP
addresses were active at any point during the same timeframe. Consequently, these
attributes were not selected as features.

Figure 8: Active User Distribution
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The features selected for this research (Table 3) were derived from aggregate values
using the Neptune, DHCP, and IPS source types.

Table 3: Features used for Machine Learning

The “Neptune” source type contains event data from four Windows servers running
Microsoft Internet Information Server (IIS). The structure of this source type adheres to
the W3C Extended Log File standard [Hallam-Baker96]. The events contained in this
source type are the result of user email activity. The features derived from this source
type include the total number of HTTP POST and GET requests, the total number of
successful and unsuccessful requests, the distinct count of users, and the number of
Active Sync, Web Access, and MAC users. The sample event in Figure 9 depicts in bold
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print the portions used to derive the postCount, activeSyncUserCount, uniqueUserCount,
and HTTP2XX features. The features uniqueIPCount and uniqueUserCount appear to
have a strong correlation as shown in Table 4.

D:\Elfa_Data\Neptune\Raw\4\u_ex150419_x.log,293972,2015-04-19,23:59:59,139.62.192.204,POST,
/Microsoft-ServerActiveSync/default.eas,User=User951&DeviceId=ApplDKVLK09WDVGF&DeviceType=iPad
&Cmd=Ping&CorrelationID=<empty>;&ClientId=EPYTCILETMFIVQOYCFG
&cafeReqId=f0cf56aa-c4b7-4474-8f5e-4ec2b0e4d895;,443,UNFCSD\User951,139.62.193.253,
Apple-iPad3C2/1206.69,,200,0,0,24625,76.122.20.229

Figure 9: IIS Log Entry Sample

Table 4: Correlation Results for Features

The DHCP source type contains event data from three UNIX servers which process
requests for the network (IP) address for hosts connecting to the network using Dynamic
Host Configuration Protocol [Droms97]. The sample event depicted in Figure 10 is used
to derive the feature DHCPDiscover.
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Apr 19 23:59:58 thrasher dhcpd: DHCPDISCOVER from 40:25:c2:7b:d3:14 via eth0

Figure 10: DHCP Log Entry Sample

The IPS source type contains event data from the Tipping Point Intrusion Prevention
System (IPS), an industry standard Intrusion Prevention System. The IPS system logs
events when any network traffic matching a rule is detected. The sample event depicted
in Figure 11 is used to derive the following features: blockCount, facultyCount , and
foreignIPCount.

2015-04-19 23:59:34",Low,"7611: DNS Reputation",Reputation,Block,1,FacultyStaff,139.62.200.212,34847,199.249.119.1,53,192,download.newnext.me

Figure 11: IPS Log Entry Sample

4.4

Pre-Processing

The Splunk search in Figure 12 was used to create the datasets for this research by
varying earliest and latest date-time values. The results were exported into a CSV format.
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index=main (sourcetype=neptune OR sourcetype=tpsms OR sourcetype=dhcp) earliest=04/19/2015:21:00:0
latest=04/20/2015:0:0:0 | eval statusCd=substr(sc_status,1,1) | iplocation DEST_IP | bucket _time span=1m | eval
dhcpCMD=if(match(_raw,"DHCPDISCOVER"),"DISCOVER","") | eval userType=if(like(cs_uri_stem,"%owa%"),"OWA",
if(like(cs_uri_stem,"%Microsoft-Server-ActiveSync%"),"ASYNC", if(like(cs_User_Agent,"MacOutlook%"),
"MACOUTLOOK", "OTHER"))) | stats count(eval(cs_method="POST")) as postCount, count(eval(cs_method="GET"))
as getCount, dc(cs_username) as uniqueUserCount, dc(OriginalIP) as uniqueIPCount, count(eval(statusCd="2")) as
HTTP2XX, count(eval(statusCd="4")) as HTTP4XX, count(eval(statusCd="5")) as HTTP5XX, mode(FILTER) as
primaryReason, count(eval(userType="OWA")) as owaUserCount, count(eval(userType="ASYNC")) as
activeSyncUserCount, count(eval(userType="MACOUTLOOK")) as macUserCount,
count(eval(dhcpCMD="DISCOVER")) as DHCPDiscover, count(eval(Country!="United States")) as foreignIPCount,
count(eval(PROFILE="Faculty-Staff")) as facultyCount, count(eval(PROFILE="Dorms-Guest")) as studentCount,
count(eval(ACTION="Block")) as blockCount, count(eval(ACTION="Permit")) as permitCount, mode(VLAN_NUM) as
primaryVLAN by _time

Figure 12: Splunk Transformation Query

The exported CSV data is converted into a sliding window representation using an RScript. The purpose of this step is to preserve a continuous set of temporal values as the
system advances through each row in the dataset which contains the aggregate feature
counts for one time slot. For example, given a time slot size of five minutes and a sixty
minute time window starting at 21:00, the first row in the dataset contains aggregate
feature counts for the time slot from 21:00 through 21:04. The second row contains
aggregate feature counts from 21:01 through 21:05, and so forth. The start time for each
subsequent time slot starts one-minute later than the previous time slot began. The time
slot start and end times are included as the first two fields of each dataset as shown in
Figure 13. These time fields were not used for machine learning, instead, are included in
order to provide the actual time frame to a security analyst for investigation purposes.
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Figure 13: Partial Dataset Image

4.5

Unsupervised Learning Results

A classified dataset consisting of normal and abnormal activity is needed for supervised
learning to occur. Classification would be extremely labor intensive due to the massive
size of the log files. For example, if activity in one-time slot warranted investigation, a
security analyst could potentially need to review over 30,000 log entries, thus making
visual identification and classification impossible.

Generating synthetic data for abnormal activity was considered because there were no
known security incidents during the timeframe the log data was collected. However,
there is an inherent risk when assuming that the log data contains only normal activity. If
anomalies exist in the data, the model may inaccurately classify instances, or worse
ignore real security incidents. Consequently, clustering was used to identify anomalous
activity within the training dataset.

The Partitioning Around Medoids (PAM) algorithm was chosen to classify the dataset
into three clusters of activity. PAM was chosen because it is resistant to outliers and
allows clustering of categorical values. Each cluster is classified as normal, critical, or
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warning, and is labeled green, red, or yellow, respectively. The cluster score is calculated
from the median value of the sum of all features and is used to determine the label
assigned to each cluster. R code for calculating the cluster score is depicted in Figure 14.
The cluster with the lowest score was labeled green. The cluster with the highest score
was labeled red, and the remaining cluster was labeled yellow.

l<-which(wbpam$clustering %in% c(1))
cluster.scores<c(median(rowSums(tw[l,])))
l<-which(wbpam$clustering %in% c(2))
cluster.scores<-c(cluster.scores,
median(rowSums(tw[l,])))
l<-which(wbpam$clustering %in% c(3))
cluster.scores<-c(cluster.scores,
median(rowSums(tw[l,])))
print(cluster.scores)

Figure 14: R Code to Calculate Cluster Scores

The classification results for each dataset are shown in Figure 15. It is worth noting that
all of the cluster scores resulting from Dataset 2 are lower than those from Dataset 1. The
green cluster score from Dataset 2 is fifty-seven percent lower its counterpart.

Figure 15: Clustering Confusion Matrixes
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Figure 16 contains box plots depicting the difference in the scale of activity for each
dataset. The Y-axis represents the sum of all features for each instance in a cluster. The
normal and warning clusters in Dataset 2 overlap. Further analysis will reveal that the
skewed results from the clustering Dataset 2 were due to clustering on such a large time
window.

Figure 16: Cluster Scores

Typical user activity patterns appear to follow a Gaussian distribution throughout a
normal business day. This is illustrated by the data from Dataset 2 in Figure 17. As a
result, the peak activity times in Dataset 2 were classified as red, non-peak as green, and
the transition period as yellow.
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Figure 17: User Activity Distribution

Table 5 depicts the time slots color-coded according to each cluster in Dataset 1 and
includes the total events, average number of events per minute (EPM), start and end
times, and classification duration in minutes.
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Cluster Beginning Ending
Time Slot Time
Slot

Start
Time

End
Time

Duration
(min)

AVG
EPM

Total
Events

Green

1

16

21:00

21:20

20

1,324

26,474

Yellow

17

18

21:16

21:22

6

2,934

17,603

Red

19

34

21:18

21:38

20

5,456

109,111

Yellow

35

37

21:34

21:41

7

3,623

25,363

Green

38

83

21:37

22:27

50

1,250

62,501

Yellow

84

105

22:23

22:49

26

3,054

79,391

Red

106

108

22:45

22:52

7

4,018

28,123

Yellow

109

110

22:48

22:54

6

3,384

20,303

Green

111

115

22:50

22:59

9

2,110

18,991

Yellow

116

117

22:55

23:01

6

3,219

19,315

Red

118

152

22:57

23:36

39

5,361

209,096

Yellow

153

157

23:32

23:41

9

4,938

44,442

Red

158

166

23:37

23:50

13

5,297

68,858

Yellow

167

169

23:46

23:53

7

3,349

23,4438

Green

170

176

23:49

00:00

11

1,614

17,750

Table 5: Time Slot Classification Results

Plotting the feature postCount confirms anomalous user activity occurred during the
three-hour time window, shown in the top half of Figure 18. The red line is the average of
events per minute of the red clusters in Table 5. The activity above this line indicates
abnormal activity. The area between the yellow and red lines is indicative of a border
state between normal and abnormal activity.
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The bottom chart in Figure 18 is a time chart of the feature postCount from Dataset 2
using the same boundaries as the top graph. The amount of time above the red line is
notably smaller than that from Dataset 1.

Figure 18: HTTP POST Requests

Approximately 38 percent of the user activity in Dataset 2 was classified as abnormal. If
we assume user activity remains constant throughout the day, the thresholds should
remain constant. However, the chart of Dataset 2 (48 hours) in Figure 18 using the same
threshold for abnormal activity as Dataset 1, shows most of the activity is below the
control boundary. It is apparent that the threshold for abnormal activity changes
throughout the day based on user activity and the size of the time window chosen impacts
the accuracy of the clustering results. In this case, a larger time window produced biased
results.
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Future experiments using a smaller time window and a larger period of activity are
expected to result in more accurate clustering and facilitate learning routine activity
patterns specific to any hour of any day of the week.

4.6

Supervised Learning Results

The R package “h2o” was used to train and test a neural network using the deep learning
algorithm. The dataset was split into 70/30 % for training and testing, respectively,
maintaining an equal proportion of each class in both the training and test sets.

The experiments conducted used one hundred epochs and the hyperbolic tangent for the
activation function. Determining the optimal network topology is not a trivial task.
Therefore these experiments used a simple network topology of one hidden layer with
two neurons. Table 6 depicts the overall results of the deep learning algorithm on both
datasets. The larger dataset (Dataset 2) resulted in greater accuracy. The confusion
matrixes for both datasets are depicted in Table 7. The accuracy of the Deep Learning
algorithm was slightly less than that of the Weka Multi-Level Perceptron (MLP). The h2o
deep learning algorithm was significantly faster than the Weka MLP.
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Table 6: Deep Learning Results

Table 7: Deep Learning Confusion Matrixes
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Chapter 5

: Experiments and Results

EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS

5.1

Overview

In the previous section, it was shown that user activity typically follows a normal
distribution and can vary with the time of day. In order to account for the dynamic nature
of user activity and preserve the prediction accuracy of the model, the experiments
described in this section will introduce two new features and several new methods, such
as normalization, rule-based clustering, split-level clustering, and topology analysis.
Finally, the model was trained and evaluated using the original datasets used in the
previous section, in addition to a newly created dataset.

5.2

Data Collection

A third and final dataset that spans approximately two calendar weeks was created for the
purposes of evaluating the model performance on a larger sample of log data. This
dataset was used to train the model to learn normal activity patterns that occur at various
times during the day and evaluate its performance at detecting those user activities that
fall outside of the normal range. It is worth noting that the new dataset is a superset of the
other two datasets (Table 8).
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Table 8: Dataset Definitions

Each dataset is composed of one-minute feature aggregates derived from the original log
files. The features used for machine learning are depicted in Table 9. The source log file
of each feature is listed with its description. This is the same feature set used in the
previous section, with the addition of the two new calculated fields: dhour and wday.
The purpose of introducing the new features is to model the dynamic nature of user
activity over time. For example, a normally occurring pattern during the afternoon may
not normally occur in the middle of the night, and hence is suspicious in nature or could
be an attack.
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Table 9: Features used for Machine Learning

5.3

Pre-processing

The pre-processing module converts the datasets listed in Table 8 into a five-minute
sliding window representation by summing the feature aggregates. The reason for using
the sum instead of the median or mean is that the mean or median could mask a subtle
fluctuation in an activity that would otherwise go unnoticed. Additionally, the preprocessing module introduces two new features which allow the neural network to
accurately differentiate abnormal activity from fluctuations that may normally occur
throughout the day. The new features are wday and dhour. The wday feature is the
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ordinal number of the calendar day of the week (0-6). The dhour feature represents the
hour of the timeslot (0-23). The time required for preprocessing each dataset is listed in
Table 10.

Table 10: Pre-processing Times

5.3.1

Normalization

Normalization is performed by the pre-processing module to prepare the data for machine
learning. The purpose of normalization is to bring all features into a common range so
that one feature does not have higher precedence than any other feature. Normalization
was performed on each feature column using Min-Max normalization [Figure 19].

Figure 19: MinMax Normalization
Normalization allows for easier comparison when charting features with a different scale.
Additionally, normalization can speed up the time required to train the neural network
[Han06]. Normalizing the dataset preserves the shape of the feature plots as can be seen
in Figure 20.
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Figure 20: Effect of Normalization

5.4

Unsupervised Learning Results

The source log files used for this research were not known to have any intrusions at the
time they were collected, and as a consequence, the datasets were not labeled. Abnormal
activity patterns were discovered to exist within the data. However, there lacked a
sufficient sample to train a neural network effectively. Due to the size of the log files,
manual labeling of a dataset would require intensive effort. Hence, the Partitioning
around Medoids (PAM) algorithm was used to create a labeled dataset with a
proportional number of examples for each class. The PAM clustering results are shown in
Table 11.
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Table 11: PAM Clustering Results

Three classifications were chosen to model a common business view of user activity. The
classifications green, yellow, and red were used. These classifications also reflect the
criticality or urgency of activity. Normal user activity patterns are labeled green. Known
attack patterns or activities that have a high sense of urgency are labeled red. Patterns that
are suspicious, unknown or are a precursor to a cyber attack are labeled yellow.

Each of the datasets was partitioned into three clusters and labeled using a cluster scoring
function. The cluster score was calculated by summing of the features of the cluster’s
medoid. The cluster with the lowest score was labeled green. The cluster with the largest
score was labeled red, and the remaining cluster was labeled yellow. The medoids for
each of the datasets are shown in Tables 12, 13, and 14.
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Table 12: Medoids for Dataset 1
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Table 13: Medoids for Dataset 2
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Table 14: Medoids for Dataset 3

5.4.1

Rule-based Clustering

Rule-based clustering was introduced to provide a different method of labeling data since
clustering resulted in a near linear split of the data. This method attempts to fit the data to
a more complex, non-linear equation which would be more representative of an attack.
Additionally, a Subject Matter Expert (SME) may classify some events in the logs
differently from another SME. The rule set chosen does not impact the validity of this
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approach, as such the rules used in this experiment could be replaced with an entirely
different set and achieve similar results.

This method utilized four rules that explicitly reference features from three different log
sources. The rules were derived from an interview with a security analyst from a
discussion on what events could represent attacks in the logs. Using the same
classifications introduced earlier, the classes were defined as follows. Instances that
matched one of the rules were labeled yellow, while instances that matched more than
one rule were labeled red. Instances that did not match any of the rule patterns were
labeled green. The results of the rule-based classification are depicted in Table 15.

Table 15: Rule-based Clustering Results

The rules used in this method are listed below.
▪

Rule 1: High rates of DHCP discover requests are representative of a DHCP
starvation attack.

▪

Rule 2: High connection counts to foreign IP’s with a high rate of HTTP POST
requests could be a malware attack.
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▪

Rule 3: High rate of HTTP GET requests with low unique user counts could be
representative of a denial of service attack.

▪

Rule 4: High number of unauthorized attempts for access is likely to be
reconnaissance for an attack.

In order to provide a proportional number of examples for each class, the quantile
function was used on the feature values to establish a dynamic threshold. For example, all
instances where the DHCP discover value exceeds the 75% quantile were considered an
attack. This method was faster than using PAM clustering. Clustering the two-week
dataset using PAM took just under two hours compared to the rule-based method which
took just over two minutes. The rule-based method also resulted in a smaller proportion
of non-normal examples than the PAM method. For example, using the PAM method on
Dataset 3 resulted in approximately 33% of activity in each cluster. The rule-based
method classified 18% of the activity as critical or red.

5.4.2

Feature Ranking

After the datasets had been labeled, the features were ranked using an Information Gain
attribute evaluator using Weka. The feature ranking for the PAM clustered data is shown
in Table 16. The wday feature is a constant value in the three-hour dataset. Hence it was
ranked zero. Any of the features ranked zero could be dropped without impacting the
accuracy of the model, however, all of the features were retained for the experiments in
this research. The new features have a higher ranking in the other two datasets. The
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features targeted by the rule-based clustering were ranked higher than the other features
as can be seen in Table 17.

Table 16: PAM Feature Ranking

Table 17: Rule-based Feature Ranking
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5.4.3

Split-level Clustering

Split-level clustering was introduced to simulate a non-linear method of classifying the
dataset. PAM is used to partition the dataset into three clusters. Each of the resulting
clusters is then partitioned using PAM to create three clusters which are labeled green,
yellow, or red according to their respective cluster score. The resulting nine clusters are
combined according to their labeled color and used to create a dataset which is then used
for evaluation purposes of the deep learning algorithm using multiple hidden layers.
Figure 21 depicts the process used by the split-level clustering method.

Figure 21: Split-Level Clustering Process

The split-level concept seems similar to hierarchical clustering; however it is not really
for several reasons. First, the algorithm used is Partitioning among Medoids (PAM)
which is a partitioning algorithm. Second, the number of clusters in hierarchical
clustering is determined by the height in the tree, whereas the number of clusters is
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specified for PAM. There are two types of hierarchical clustering methods.
Agglomerative is a bottom-up technique which starts with every instance in its own
cluster, and then merges the clusters until they are all in a single cluster. Divisive, a topdown strategy, starts with all the instances in one cluster and then subdivides the cluster
until each instance is in its own cluster. In the split-level method, the height is constant,
and the final number of clusters is controlled by k used in the second level which should
match the levels of user activity used for classification.

5.5

Supervised Learning Results

Supervised learning was performed using the h2o deep learning algorithm [h2o17] to
train and test the model using each of labeled datasets created during unsupervised
learning. The datasets were split into training and test sets comprising 70% and 30% of
the data respectively. The training set was used solely to train the neural network, and the
test set was reserved for testing and evaluation purposes. The parameters for the h2o deep
learning algorithm are the number of epochs, the activation function, and the hidden layer
topology. The hidden layer parameter is a vector containing the number of neurons for
each hidden layer. The activation function used was the Hyperbolic Tangent, and the
number of epochs used for this research was 1000. The optimal number of epochs was
determined through experimentation using 100, 1,000, and 10,000 epochs taking into
account the accuracy and time to train the model.

Deep learning tests were conducted using the PAM labeled datasets varying the number
of hidden neurons from 2 to 20 in a single hidden layer. The results shown in Table 18
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are from a single test on each dataset. The deep learning algorithm automatically dropped
the wday feature in the three-hour dataset because the value was constant.

Table 18: Deep Learning Results using PAM Labeled Data

The resulting confusion matrices for each of the tests are shown in Table 19. There were
no false negatives for Datasets 1 and 2. There were ten false negatives for the larger
dataset where only two were classified as normal. There was only one false positive for

- 59 -

Datasets 1 and 2. The larger dataset resulted in seventeen false positives where only four
were classified as critical.

Table 19: Deep Learning Confusion Matrices for PAM Labeled Data

The single layer topology analysis in Table 20 shows the deep learning results for Dataset
1 of the various neuron configurations while holding all other parameters constant. There
is no difference in performance with two, three, or four neurons. Adding a fifth neuron
allowed the model to achieve 100% accuracy, precision, and recall.
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Table 20: Single Layer Topology Analysis PAM Labeling Using Dataset 1

The single layer topology analysis for Dataset 2 is shown in Table 21. Two hidden
neurons produced the best accuracy for this dataset. Adding more neurons had no effect
and in some cases reduced the accuracy slightly. The total time to train the model was
only 5.69 seconds.
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Table 21: Single Layer Topology Analysis PAM Labeling Using Dataset 2

The single layer topology analysis results for the largest dataset are shown in Table 22.
Ten hidden neurons produced the highest accuracy (99.33%) and took 170 seconds to
train the model. A single layer of six hidden neurons yielded an accuracy of 99.01%
while only taking 54.5 seconds for training.
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Table 22: Single Layer Topology Analysis PAM Labeling Using Dataset 3

Deep learning tests were conducted using the Rule-based labeled datasets varying the
number of hidden neurons from 2 to 20 in a single hidden layer. The results shown in
Table 23 are from a single test on each dataset. The time to train the model using the
Rule-based labeled datasets was significantly longer than the PAM labeled datasets. For
example, the largest rule-based dataset took 90.5 seconds to train compared to the
comparable PAM labeled dataset which took 53.7 seconds. The accuracy of the Rulebased datasets was also lower than the accuracy with the PAM labeled datasets.
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Table 23: Deep Learning Results Using Rule-based Labeled Data

The resulting confusion matrices for each of the tests are shown in Table 24. Looking at
the red cluster, we can see there were no false negatives predicted for Dataset 1; thirtynine false negatives occurred while classifying Dataset 2, and only fourteen false
negatives were encountered classifying the test set of Dataset 3.
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Table 24: Confusion Matrices for Rule-based Labeled Data

The single layer topology analysis in Table 25 shows the deep learning results for Dataset
1 of the various neuron configurations while holding all other parameters constant. A
single hidden layer with five neurons yielded an accuracy of 84.3% while classifying the
test set of Dataset 1.
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Table 25: Single Layer Topology Analysis Rule-based Labeling Using Dataset 1

The single layer topology analysis in Table 26 shows the deep learning results using
Dataset 2 for the different hidden neuron configurations. The configuration using eleven
neurons in the single hidden layer yielded an accuracy of 95.47% with a training time of
28.1 seconds.
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Table 26: Single Layer Topology Analysis Rule-based Labeling Using Dataset 2

The single layer topology analysis in Table 27 shows the deep learning results using
Dataset 3 for the different hidden neuron configurations. The configuration using five
neurons in the single hidden layer yielded an accuracy of 97.97% with a training time of
90.5 seconds.
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Table 27: Single Layer Topology Analysis Rule-based Labeling Using Dataset 3

5.5.1

Neural Network Topology

Defining the neural network topology must be completed prior to training. Defining the
input and output layers are relatively straightforward. For the experiments conducted in
this research, eighteen neurons were used for the input layer, one neuron for each feature.
Three neurons were used for the output layer, one neuron for each possible classification.
Generally, there is no best practice for selecting the number of hidden layers or neurons,
but these values should not be arbitrarily selected [Han06]. As the number of neurons
increases, the neural network’s hypothesis function becomes more complex. Using more
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than one hidden layer allows for implementing a more complex function on the data. An
overly complex hypothesis function will learn the function of the underlying data
including any noise resulting in poor generalization. This is known as overfitting. Finding
the hypothesis with the minimum training error will result in the best fit. Conversely, if
the hypothesis function is less complex than the data, the generalization error will be
high. This is known as under-fitting. Selecting the number of hidden layers and neurons
for each layer was accomplished by varying the number of hidden neurons in each layer
and examining the results.

As the patterns and relationships in the data become more complex, the required number
of hidden layers needed to learn a nonlinear relationship increase. In order to simulate
such a nonlinear equation, testing of multiple hidden layer configurations was
accomplished using the two split-level labeled datasets.

The optimal number of layers was determined by running tests on a single layer with 2 to
20 neurons. The number of neurons that produced the greatest accuracy or f-score with
the least amount of training time was then held constant while varying the second layer of
neurons from 2 to 20. Finally, a third hidden layer was added using the optimal number
of neurons identified in the previous two runs. The layer that produced the greatest
accuracy or f-score was selected as the most optimum hidden layer configuration.
The topology analysis for the first hidden layer using Dataset 2 is shown in Table 28. The
configuration with 16 neurons produced an accuracy of 97.2% with a training time of
39.5 seconds.
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Table 28: Layer 1 Topology Analysis Split Level Using Dataset 2

The results from the next step using two hidden layers with the first layer having 16
neurons while varying the number of neurons in the second layer from 2 to 20 are shown
in Table 29. The hidden layer topology of 16, 15 neurons yielded an accuracy of 97.8%.
The two layer hidden layer topology is optimal because it yielded a greater accuracy than
the single layer topology. The gain was 0.6% accuracy at the cost of 20 seconds of
additional training time.
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Table 29: Layer 2 Topology Analysis Split Level Using Dataset 2

The topology analysis for the first hidden layer using Dataset 3 is shown in Table 30. The
configuration with 17 neurons produced an accuracy of 94.2% with a training time of
200.8 seconds. The configuration with 15 neurons produced a lower accuracy of 91.5%,
but with a training time of 66 seconds.
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Table 30: Layer 1 Topology Analysis Split Level Using Dataset 3

The first test conducted selected the neuron configuration that yielded the most accurate
results with the best time to train. The results from the next step using two hidden layers
with the first layer having 15 neurons while varying the number of neurons in the second
layer from 2 to 20 are shown in Table 31. The hidden layer topology of 15, 6 neurons
yielded an accuracy of 95%.

- 72 -

Table 31: Layer 2 Topology Analysis Split Level Using Dataset 3

The results of the third layer topology analysis with the first and second layer containing
15 and 6 neurons are displayed in Table 32. The best three layer configuration consists of
15, 6, and 12 neurons, yielding an accuracy of 93.1% and f-score of 91.8% with a
training time of 199.3 seconds. The two layer hidden layer topology is optimal because it
yielded a greater accuracy than both the single layer and third layer topology.

- 73 -

Table 32: Layer 3 Topology Analysis Split Level PAM Dataset 3

The second test used the 17 neuron configuration which yielded the most accurate results
in the single layer test. Examining the results of the second layer topology analysis in
Table 33, we can see a network topology configuration of two hidden layers with 17
neurons in each layer is the optimal choice yielding an accuracy of 96.3% and f-score of
96.2%. The best one layer configuration with 17 neurons was 94.2% accuracy and f-score
of 93.5%. The best three layer configuration with 17, 17, and 4 neurons yielded an
accuracy of 94.4% and f-score of 94.0%.
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Table 33: Layer 2 Topology Analysis Split Level PAM Dataset 3

5.5.2

Additional observations

Scalability is achieved using the time slot to model the data. For example, Dataset 1
represented a total of 995,701 events in 176 instances. Time to test was 0.094 seconds
using 52 instances. Dataset 2 was created from 12,786,858 events and was reduced to
2,876 instances. Time to test was 0.093 seconds using 861 instances. The number of
instances increased by a factor of 16, but the time to test was faster by 0.001 seconds.
Dataset 3 was comprised of 18,896 instances and represented 102,993,636 raw events.
Time to test was 1.145 seconds. The time to test Dataset 3 was 12 times that of Dataset 1
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where Dataset 3 was 363 times larger than Dataset 1. It is evident that increasing the
amount of data increases the time to test linearly.

Including additional log files will not increase the number of instances in the dataset, but
instead will only add columns equal to the number of features extracted from each log
file added.

5.5.3

Implementation considerations

There are several factors that should be considered before training the model whether it is
the initial training or subsequent feedback sessions. First, the security analyst will need a
tool for examining or discovering suspicious patterns in the log data. The PAM clustering
method used in this research does not serve as such a tool.

Additionally, each training session should use current data that contains a proportionate
number of examples for each class. There are a number of methods that can be used to
obtain attack training data. The easiest method is to use data gathered during a real
breach. Another method is to use Honey Pots, systems which are designed to ferret out
hackers and learn new methods. Logs gleaned from penetration or vulnerability scans can
also be a valuable source of log attack data. Lastly, existing data can be programmatically
modified to represent potential incidents or attacks.

Over time user activity patterns change, and new patterns may ensue. Also, existing
features may have been overlooked, initially deemed not relevant, or introduced through
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the procurement of new computer system. As a result, the performance of the model will
eventually degrade and become unacceptable. In this event, features should be reevaluated for relevance prior to retraining the model with a fresh set of log data.

For subsequent training sessions, the security analyst can use logs that were manually
marked as suspicious or attack through normal daily investigations. When there are a
sufficient number of examples, they can be added to the initial dataset and used to retain
the model.

- 77 -

Chapter 6

: Conclus ion and Future Work

CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK

The results of the experiments conducted in this thesis demonstrate that a classified
dataset with a proportional set of examples trained with the Deep Learning algorithm can
accurately detect abnormal activity. This method allows for multiple log source types to
be aligned using a sliding time window and provides a scalable solution which is a muchneeded feature.

In a typical enterprise environment, the amount of log data processed could vary from
several hundred gigabytes to a terabyte daily. The prototype developed in this research
was relatively small consisting of a set of eighteen features from three different log
source types totaling approximately twenty-five gigabytes in size. This research
demonstrated the prototype could very accurately model low complexity data with a
shallow network. However, the complexity of the data increases as more log sources and
features are introduced. This research demonstrated that highly complex data could be
accurately modeled using a deep neural network.

Detecting a cyber attack is just the beginning of a long, complicated investigative
process. The security analyst may need to perform risk mitigation actions, such as
blacklisting originating source IP’s and locking accounts. Logs files need to be examined
to identify any compromised accounts, originating IP’s, and all resources accessed by the
attacker. All related activities should be collected and examined several weeks or even
months before the detected event. Potential areas of future work are automatic correlation
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and analysis of the log data from cyber attacks. Additional machine learning algorithms
and analysis required for automatic correlation can put a strain on computing resources
depending on the volume of data to be searched and velocity of the log data being
collected. Additional areas of future work include building a distributed computing
implementation such as Hadoop with terabytes of log data.
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